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In-Depth
Is China Building Africa?
By Zhengli Huang and Xiangming Chen
China & the World
In this article, the authors address 
the question “Is China Building 
Africa?” by examining the true 
nature of  China’s infrastructure de-
velopment projects in Africa, and 
how the different players involved 
interact with each other.   
“The US destroys and China builds,” was how a taxi driver from Ethiopia in 
Washington DC responded to Chen’s 
question about China’s main activity in 
Africa. Building is what China has been 
doing, on a massive scale, with projects 
of  all kinds sited in African cities and 
spread across this vast continent. Having 
built the $150 million gleaming new 
conference centre at the headquarters 
of  the African Union in Addis Ababa, 
China recently signed a contract worth 
$12 billion to build the Coastal Railway 
in Nigeria stretching 650 km across 
the country from Calabar in the east to 
Aba, Port Harcourt, Warri, Benin City 
and Lagos in the west. Never before in 
human history have we seen the specta-
cle of  a continental-sized China, which 
was as poor as most African countries 
only 30 years ago, building up Africa’s 
infrastructure on such a scale that could 
help the world’s poorest continent catch 
up in development.
China’s dominant role in building 
Africa’s infrastructure has been contro-
versial despite two generally agreed posi-
tions. The first is that Africa lags severely 
behind other developing regions in infra-
structure and has a craving demand for 
catching up. The second is that China 
is meeting that demand more than any 
other country, with its companies, espe-
cially state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
and workers labouring away on projects 
that range from municipal buildings and 
dams to roads and railways that begin to 
stitch together poorly connected African 
cities and regions. 
State-led economic development and 
infrastructure provision in China often 
implies that its central government can 
extend its experience in shaping the 
scale and speed of  infrastructure devel-
opment in Africa.1 Some even suggest 
that China is exporting its infrastruc-
ture production as a political leverage 
in Africa. However, Huang’s experience 
working with Chinese SOEs in Nairobi 
and other places in Africa leads us to 
make an alternative argument backed 
by evidence marshalled in this article. 
Chinese SOEs are generally miscon-
ceived as political allies with the central 
government, while their corporative 
nature with a profit orientation and 
financial constraints is largely over-
looked. This bias tends to inflate the 
political rhetoric of  China building Africa. 
We question “Is China Building 
Africa” by probing the hidden inter-
face between the strategic and prag-
matic levels of  China’s involvement in 
Africa’s infrastructure development. We 
do so by examining: 1) how the political 
rhetoric is translated into any practical 
strategies; 2) how the different players, 
including the government represent-
atives of  China, the Export-Import 
Bank of  China (EximBank), the sub-
sidiaries of  the SOEs in Africa, as well 
as the local authorities and agencies, 
interact with one another in initiating 
and executing infrastructure projects, 
and 3) the benefits and risks for the 
various parties now and into the future 
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Figure 1. China’s Share in Africa’s Construction Market³
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of  Africa’s infrastructure development.
Dominating the African  
Infrastructure Market
China plays the most important exter-
nal role in Africa’s infrastructure con-
struction, as the largest contracting 
nation in Africa. Europe used to be 
Africa’s largest contractor, accounting 
for 44.3% of  the region’s total market 
revenue in 2002, but its share declined 
to 34.6% in 2011. The market share of  
US contractors dropped even more, 
from 24.1% in 2002 to 6.7% in 2011. In 
contrast, the market share of  Chinese 
companies rose sharply from 9.9% 
in 2002 to 40.1% in 2011, and has re-
mained fairly stable2 (see Figure 1 on 
previous page).
From a related perspective, Africa 
has become China’s largest market in 
its overall overseas contracting work. 
In 2008, Africa grew to account for 
almost half  of  China’s overseas con-
struction markets, surpassing Asia 
(32%) for the first time in history (see 
Figure 2 above).4
 The data in Figure 2 refer to the 
projects commissioned to Chinese 
SOEs by customers in the African 
countries, usually their national gov-
ernments. When it comes to the fi-
nancing of  African infrastructure, 
China’s involvement is quite different. 
While China is the largest funder of  
African infrastructure as a nation-
al government,6 its financing is more 
limited than other funding sources (see 
Figure 3 on left), especially in compar-
ison with its dominant role in project 
contracting and construction.
It is important to distinguish the 
roles and responsibilities of  Chinese 
entities in financing vs. building Africa’s 
infrastructure projects that carry varied 
short- and long-term benefits and risks. 
There are two distinctive dimensions 
to Chinese entities building in Africa. 
The China-funding aspect refers to the 
projects where Chinese entities, usually 
the EximBank, occasionally the SOEs 
themselves, play a major role in funding 
the projects. They could potentially 
become a shareholder in such pro-
jects, which are not necessarily built by 
Chinese contractors, although the latter 
are involved in most cases. Second, the 
China-contracted projects are those that 
are built by Chinese enterprises, mostly 
SOEs, but not necessarily funded by the 
Chinese government.
The data above reveal the different 
levels of  China’s involvement in con-
tracting and financing African infra-
structure development. It is clear that 
China is more of  a contractor and 
builder than a financier. Whilst China 
is building the majority of  infrastruc-
ture projects in Africa, the financing 
of  these projects often comes from 
sources other than Chinese banks, and 
companies themselves (see Figure 4 on 
next page).
Silent Builders and Limited Influence
In revealing the disparity between 
China’s financing and building roles in 
Africa’s infrastructure, we highlight a 
complex environment in which many 
Chinese SOEs are limited to a mar-
ginal position, even though they are 
the contractors and builders of  most 
infrastructure projects. This environ-
ment features multiple sources of  
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Figure 2. China’s Top Contractors’ Turnovers in Various Overseas Markets⁵
Figure 3. China’s Growing But Still Limited Share in Financing Africa’s Infrastructure 
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financing that both facilitate and inhibit 
China’s extensive presence and influ-
ence in Africa’s infrastructure sector. 
As suggested by the most recent ICA 
report (2014),8 the largest investment 
in infrastructure in Africa comes from 
the African governments themselves. 
Normally this is enhanced by external 
financial sources, the largest being ICA 
funding, that mainly include the OECD 
countries and regional banks such as the 
World Bank and African Development 
Bank (AfDB). A typical financing struc-
ture and flow is illustrated in Figure 5.
In this scheme, when Chinese enti-
ties participate as contractors, their re-
sponsibility is to “build the project to 
specification on time.”10 The Chinese 
contractors sometimes complain that 
they are at the bottom of  the supply 
chain. Not only do they have to face 
the challenge of  cost control, but they 
are also positioned at the frontline of  
social and political clashes, a challenge 
they are not equipped to address. On 
some occasions, conflict in landown-
ership may halt a project. In Kenya, 
Nigeria, Angola and elsewhere, there 
have been projects cancelled in the 
middle of  construction, causing tre-
mendous loss to both the host country 
and the Chinese contractors.11
Given the Chinese enterprises’ state-
owned nature, they are likely to be seen 
as more politically oriented. In principle, 
Chinese SOEs have been ‘modernised’ 
since the Company Law was passed in 
1993, and are supposed to follow inter-
national corporative practices, through 
the separation of  ownership and control. 
In reality, the central government contin-
ues to influence SOEs mainly through 
two mechanisms: the de facto share-
holder of  State Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) 
and the Personnel Appointment System.12 
For the subsidiaries of  SOEs operating 
in Africa, decision-making is naturally 
decentralised and largely localised, which 
limits the leverage of  SASAC. 
The subsidiaries in Africa are not 
very popular among their mother 
SOEs’ employees. This leads to a short-
term human resources management 
system. Junior managers would normal-
ly work in an overseas subsidiary for 2-4 
years, before being transferred back to 
China. The relatively short assignment 
makes them focus on near-term targets, 
such as maximising the number of  con-
tracts signed and the turnover of  pro-
jects, which are regarded as benchmarks 
for their promotion and subsequent 
transfers, while the long-term benefits 
and sustainability of  projects are ne-
glected or even sacrificed.
Besides this term-based personnel 
system, there is a lack of  long-term 
strategies from the Chinese govern-
ment or the SOEs to exert any posi-
tive social impact through these infra-
structure projects. This is also why the 
Chinese SOEs are usually observed as 
being segregated from the African cities 
and places where they operate. The ca-
pacity of  Chinese contractors’ com-
munication with locals is lacking partly 
Figure 4. The Disparity Between China’s Shares in Financing vs. Building Africa’s 
Infrastructure (Based on data from ENR and ICA)
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Figure 5. The Typical African Project Finance Structure⁹
Government
Equity/Golden Share
Debt Guarantees
Equity investors
· Sponsor (developer,
   construction firm, etc.)
· Infrastructure funds
· Institutional investors
Debt investors
· DFIs/ECAs/MDBs
· Commercial banks
· Capital markets
Guarantees Subsidies
Off-takers
· Utilities
· Industrial firms
· End-users
· Government availability
   payment or subsidy
Other Counterparties
· EPC Contractors
· Equipment suppliers
· Input suppliers
Concession Agreement
Off-take AgreementRecourse Agreement
SPV
· Project assets and
  specific cash-flows
· Dedicated 
  Governance and 
  Management
Financing Agreement EPC ContractSupply Agreements
Source: Lion’s Head
20-40%
60-80%
10      The European Financial Review    June - July  2016
due to the labour management system 
in Africa. Most of  the SOE employees 
in Africa are manual workers. In 2011, 
China sent 452,000 workers abroad, of  
which 243,000 were engaged in con-
struction work, accounting for 53.8% 
of  the total.13 This has created some 
misunderstanding, distrust and even 
antagonism from the host countries. 
To be fair, on most construction sites 
in Africa, the majority of  the labour 
force turns out to be local. But since 
infrastructure construction is labour-in-
tensive and there is a chronic shortage 
of  skilled labour in the local market, it 
is not surprising that a large number 
of  construction workers are sent from 
China. According to a recent study by 
Ethics Institute of  South Africa, 55% 
of  the interviewees had the impression 
that Chinese companies in Africa were 
hiring Chinese employees only.  This is 
neither true nor practical. As reported 
by China Daily in 2011, at China Roads 
and Bridges Corporation (CRBC), the 
ratio of  Chinese to local employees was 
around 1 to 15, with our caveat that 
this may not be representative of  most 
China-built infrastructure projects.
The Chinese government has a policy 
of  encouraging all SOEs to “Go Out” to 
Africa. While this policy may or may not 
be politically motivated, Chinese SOEs 
face serious challenges in following this 
policy, let alone being able to fulfill any 
political agenda behind the policy. The 
entry of  many SOEs into Africa’s infra-
structure sector creates severe compe-
tition among themselves, often leading 
to price wars and underhanded or shady 
practices. As revealed by a senate debate 
in Kenya, during a bid for C13 highway 
construction, of  the ten companies who 
submitted their bids, five were from 
China. Not surprisingly, the lowest price 
offer came from one of  the five Chinese 
companies, Jiangxi International Ltd, 
which was a well-established enterprise 
in East Africa and also building a few 
important projects in Nairobi. To be 
more specific, while the officially es-
timated cost for the project was 5.2 
billion Kenyan shilling (ca. $64 million), 
the bids from the Chinese competitors 
were 3.8 by Jiangxi International, 4.5 by 
China Wu Yi, 4.5 by China Railway No. 
5 Engineering Group, 4.8 by Shengli 
Engineering 4.8 and 5.0 by Sino Hydro. 
In comparison, a local construction 
firm with equivalent size and experience 
quoted 5.2 billion and Hayer Bishan 
Singh & Sons, an Indian company, 
offered 6.0.15  This is not rare in Africa. 
In a recent bid for an infrastructure 
project in Angola, there were 13 Chinese 
companies out of  21 bidders.
Generally speaking, there is lack of  
a strategic plan for many Chinese con-
tractors to act as truly market actors 
in the distant and unfamiliar African 
market. While the increasingly compet-
itive and saturated domestic infrastruc-
ture market in China pushes more SOE 
builders to go to Africa, many of  them 
failed to develop a long-term strategy to 
take advantage of  the market potential 
in Africa. 
The China-Africa Triangle
Although Chinese SOEs have not devel-
oped a very effective long-term strategy 
for Africa’s infrastructure market, the 
Chinese government found it critical to 
grow and diversify financing in Africa. 
Its main financing channels include 
grants, zero or low interest loans, and 
preferential export credits.16 Among 
them, the concessional loans and 
preferential export credits are the two 
main tools used by China EximBank, 
and called “the Two Preferential Loan 
Programs” (Liangyou). Figure 6 (see 
figure 6 above) captures these practic-
es through a triangular structure of  the 
agencies from the Chinese and African 
sides and their basic procedural and op-
erative interrelations.
Compared to a more detailed scheme 
developed by Deborah Brautigam,17 
our diagram left out several procedural 
steps associated with government regu-
lations. More importantly, the diagram 
shows that the three actors have in-
dependent interests and functions in 
implementing infrastructure projects, 
and that each has the ability to initiate 
a project and its financial flow between 
the three parties. This way of  visualising 
a triangular structure aims to dispel the 
illusion that the Chinese government 
agencies and policy banks (MOFCOM 
and the EximBank) always team up 
with Chinese SOEs in dealing with their 
counterpart – the African governments 
and their agencies. 
Figure 6. A Triangular Structure of Key Chinese and African Stakeholders in the 
“Two Preferential Loan Programs”
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While the bilateral agreements 
between the Chinese and African gov-
ernments are the foundation for financ-
ing any project, they do not directly lead 
to roads and bridges being built. In prac-
tice, African agencies can and may reach 
out to a Chinese company when they 
are aware of  the connection between 
the company and the EximBank or 
MOFCOM that could ease the access 
to the Two Preferential Loan Programs. On 
the other hand, Chinese SOEs, when 
bidding for projects in Africa, can use 
the government financing support to 
enhance their competitiveness against 
non-Chinese bidders.
One important drawback built into 
this framework is a lack of  third party 
evaluation and supervision of  the fi-
nancial flow between the three parties. 
In financing from sources such as 
the World Bank or JICA (Japanese 
International Cooperation Agency), a 
private or independent consultant team 
would be hired to assess and monitor 
the projects’ financial flow. In the 
China-African Triangle, the feasibility 
study usually is conducted by the SOE 
that has won and will build the project, 
supported by Chinese diplomatic of-
ficers in the embassies, evaluated by 
permanent employees of  the Bank,18 
which usually leads to reporting that 
discounts risks.
Another issue with this way of  fi-
nancing and building infrastructure 
is the unfair and irrational concentra-
tion of  risks. Once a loan is initiated, 
the SOE building the project receives 
regular payments directly from the 
EximBank, which lowers the risk of  no 
profit for the contractor. It also shifts 
the risk to be shared between the African 
Government and the EximBank. 
Considering that most of  the infrastruc-
ture loans from the EximBank offer a 
grace period of  5-10 years, the burden 
for a borrowing African government is 
significantly reduced. Since the electoral 
system in most democratic countries in 
Africa is a 3-4 year term, it is fair to say 
that the government in power would 
rather seize the financial resource for 
now than being concerned about who 
will pay back the principle plus interest 
down the road. As a result, the risks for 
potentially unpaid or defaulted loans 
end up in the hands of  the EximBank. 
This explains why MOFCOM had to 
limit the budget in funding Africa’s in-
frastructure to around 3% of  the bank’s 
profile,19 which might also account 
for the drop of  total investment from 
China to African infrastructure in 2014 
(see Figure 3).
The discussion above points to 
the fundamental loophole of  the 
EximBank’s financing model for 
African infrastructure: it’s not sus-
tainable. The repayment of  the loans 
largely depends on external elements, 
or lies in the hands of  the local agen-
cies. Even if  the Chinese government 
has any political ambition with the 
loan as the vehicle for projecting soft 
power, the other two players in the 
triangle are much more short-termed 
and opportunistic, which forestalls or 
limits the adoption of  a strategic and 
sustainable approach to infrastructure 
provision. As long as this triangular 
system dominates the financing from 
the Chinese government for Africa’s 
infrastructure, the benefits from the 
projects for all parties will be limited 
overall and unevenly distributed.
The Japanese model
When it comes to inter-governmental 
financial support for African infrastruc-
ture, or in terms of  the ODA (Official 
Development Assistance) methodolo-
gy, the Japanese model can be used as 
a comparison. China used Japan’s aid 
system as a model in developing its 
own foreign aid policies in the 1970s.20 
But the Japanese model for financing 
African infrastructure today (see Figure 
7 below) stands as an alternative to the 
Chinese approach. 
The JBIC, the equivalent of  the 
EximBank, does not enforce any 
ODA loans by itself. Instead, the 
semi-government agency JICA 
(Japanese International Cooperation 
Agency), authorised by JBIC and the 
central government, is in charge of  
financing projects in Africa. By estab-
lishing a Special Purpose Company, 
often times taking the form of  a joint 
venture with a local partner, JICA 
Figure 7. The Japanese Way of Financing African Infrastructure
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would implement strategic planning at the project level. As 
an effort to strengthen public-private partnerships, JICA 
would initiate a call for bids from private partners in Japan 
to carry out a feasibility study. The winner will then follow 
the project implementation as an important stakeholder.
The hierarchical structure reflects a strong enforcement of  
the Japanese government decisions. In addition, if  we place 
both the Chinese and the Japanese models into the framework 
shown in Figure 5, the Japanese entities would be located on 
the left side of  the diagram and maintain a long-term interest 
in a given project, while Chinese SOEs would remain on the 
right hand side in pursuit of  short-term profits.
Despite contributing a much smaller amount of  invest-
ment to Africa’s infrastructure development than China, 
Japan “has adeptly walked the fine line between assistance 
and interference, … staffed by technical experts or the 
Japanese Overseas Cooperation Volunteers, which is loosely 
analogous to the US Peace Corps. Practicing the softest of  
soft power, Japan became one of  the largest but least visible 
donors to Africa.”21 In Kenya alone, the bypasses in Nairobi 
and a highway in Kisumu were designed and funded by JICA. 
JICA also sent two expats to Nairobi’s city council to carry 
out long-term research and the metropolitan plan of  Nairobi, 
the most recent and potentially the first implemented urban 
plan after the 1948 British version for Nairobi.
Who Benefits and How?
There has been a rapid, sometimes explosive, expansion of  
Chinese contractors into the African building market. It may 
look like a large-scale aggressive strategy of  the Chinese gov-
ernment to exert political influence in Africa. However, our 
analysis suggests that Chinese SOEs are mainly profit-driv-
en in pursuing short-term economic goals, which tends to 
produce a wide-ranging but shallow impact. While China’s 
policy of  encouraging its companies to ‘GO GLOBAL’ has 
encouraged some SOEs to enter Africa’s infrastructure 
sector, many have gone in to make quick money using their 
experience and expertise in building low-cost standard infra-
structure and taking advantage of  the relatively easy access to 
financing from international, African, and Chinese lenders. 
Smaller than other sources of  financing and its building role, 
China’s financing through the EximBank and MOFCOM 
has allowed SOEs to take some risks and reap decent profits. 
At the same time, while unwilling to provide more financing 
fearing the risk of  instability in some African political regimes, 
China’s state lenders have assumed some long-term risks of  
certain African governments failing to pay back the low-in-
terest loans. In these ways, the Chinese state has blended and 
blurred with the increasingly market-oriented SOEs.    
If  China’s own development is any guide, physical infra-
structure can play an important role in Africa’s economic de-
velopment. However, it takes a long time to return on invest-
ment in transport infrastructure as the lagging demand from 
faster economic growth catches up to the supply of  newly 
built roads and railways. In a shorter time horizon, African 
local residents can benefit from the municipal infrastructure 
projects such as stadiums, schools, hospitals and light rails 
that China has also built. These immediate benefits for local 
users however will not last for the long haul if  the municipal 
facilities are not properly operated and maintained. For China, 
just building them in Africa is not good enough. Whether it 
is a sign that China has moved beyond just building in Africa, 
China has agreed to train over 100 operators for the light rail 
system it has built in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
This encouraging example aside, much of  China’s involve-
ment in African infrastructure is limited to physical construc-
tion. In most projects built by Chinese SOEs, there are limited 
contributions to local capacity building and technology trans-
fer that will make the projects truly sustainable. Therefore, 
there may be a justifiable criticism that while China has built 
massive infrastructure across Africa, the lack of  a long-
term orientation and sustainable strategy has limited mutual 
benefits for both the Chinese builders and African agen-
cies and people. This concern gets further magnified when 
some China-built infrastructure projects have displaced local 
poor and incurred environmental contamination and health 
hazards such as dumping excess oil in ditches and having 
local workers remove it without protection.22 
Chinese construction site, Ethiopia
Photo courtesy: SarahTz https://flic.kr/p/rmQRuf
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In building Africa’s infrastructure, 
is China signaling that its own devel-
opment model based on infrastruc-
ture-induced industrialisation, which 
has brought ‘miraculous’ economic 
growth, could work or be replicat-
ed in Africa? If  you built it in China, 
they or the investors did come, in very 
large numbers. But building infrastruc-
ture in Africa faces one fundamental-
ly different constraint. In China, the 
public ownership of  urban land and 
the aggressive conversion of  rural 
land from communal to public own-
ership, in conjunction with a powerful 
developmentally-oriented state, has 
allowed the government to quickly 
build massive industrial (factory zones) 
and transport (roads and railways) in-
frastructure on huge swathes of  land 
within, around, and between munic-
ipal boundaries. In Africa where land 
ownership is mostly privatised, gov-
ernment is generally weak and eco-
nomic development is primarily based 
on an extensive informal sector, it is 
an entirely different proposition and 
process to secure large and connected 
lands on which to build infrastructure. 
As a result, before we can really assess 
if  and how the constructed infrastruc-
ture in Africa will lead to faster eco-
nomic growth through more industri-
alisation, we need to figure out if  China 
is building Africa in a way that can be 
financially stable, socially responsible, 
environmentally sound, operationally 
sustainable and bring other equitable 
benefits for both sides.
*Earlier versions of  this article were present-
ed at the Eastern Sociological Society annual 
meeting in Boston, March 17-21, 2016; 
at the “Governing the Future City” work-
shop at University College London, London, 
April 21-23, 2016; and at the Center for 
Urban and Global Studies at Trinity College, 
Hartford, April 26, 2016. Helpful comments 
from these audiences were acknowledged, but 
we are responsible for any errors in facts and 
interpretations that might be in this article. 
We thank the Henry Luce Foundation for an 
institutional grant that has brought Zhengli 
Huang to Trinity College as a visiting scholar 
and facilitated the completion of  this article.  
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